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COMPLYING WITH THE MANDATE OF KOLSTAD:
ARE YOUR GOOD FAITH EFFORTS ENOUGH?

David D. Powell, Jr.
and Catherine C. Crane*

I.

INTRODUCTION

During its 1998-1999 term, the United States Supreme Court issued a
number of important decisions in the area of employment law. Two of the2
1
decisions, Faragher v. Boca Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,
addressed an employer's liability for sexual harassment committed by managers or
other supervisory personnel. A third decision, Kolstad v. American Dental
Association,3 addressed when a jury may award punitive damages against an
employer for the discriminatory conduct of its managers or other supervisory
personnel. The primary significance to employers of all three decisions lies in the
defenses they recognize for employers who may be doing the right thing but face
vicarious liability for the actions of their management-level employees. 4 Ellerth
and Faragher recognize that an employer can avoid vicarious liability for
workplace harassment committed by a member of management, if it produces
sufficient evidence that its words and deeds reflect a policy and practice of
preventing and promptly correcting the harassment.- The employer must also
demonstrate that the target of the alleged harassment essentially failed to take
advantage of the opportunities the company provided for addressing workplace
harassment or otherwise failed to avoid the harm.6 Kolstad recognized that
* David D. Powell, Jr. is a partner with the Denver-based law firm Holland & Hart LLP. He is a
member of the firm's Labor and Employment Group. He graduated from UCLA School of Law in
1983, where he served as one of the managing editors of the UCLA Law Review. Mr. Powell's practice
focuses primarily on the counsel and defense of employers in employment matters. Catherine C.

Crane is a contract associate in Holland & Hart's Labor and Employment Group. She is a 1994
graduate of George Mason University Law School, where she was a Dean's Scholar and member of the
George Mason Law Review. Her practice also focuses on the counsel and defense of employers in
employment matters.
1. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
2. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
3. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
4. As noted by the Court in Kolstad, an employer's vicarious liability for punitive damages related

to the acts of its employees is determined by whether the employee was serving in a managerial
capacity when he/she "committed the wrong." 527 U.S. at 543.
5. Faragher,524 U.S. at 807-08.
6. See id.
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although an employer may face vicarious liability for intentional discrimination or
workplace harassment committed by a manager, the company's good faith efforts
to comply with anti-discrimination laws might preclude liability for punitive
damages. All three decisions were supported by the sensible rationale that it is
unreasonable to simply allow agency principles to always punish the innocent
employer (one who makes every effort to comply with the laws prohibiting
discrimination or harassment) for the unlawful actions of its managers.8
Moreover, to do otherwise would discourage employers from proactive
compliance with Title VII and other anti-discrimination laws.9
Although the Supreme Court's opinion in Kolstad placed limits on the
circumstances in which employers will be vicariously liable for punitive damages
caused by unlawful actions of its managers, it did not prescribe concrete guidelines
for what constitutes good faith efforts to comply with the law.10 The circuit and
district courts, however, have attempted to define the circumstances in which the
truly innocent employer, through its good faith efforts, can avoid liability for
punitive damages. This article first examines the cases decided before Kolstad
that applied similar factors to determine if an employer's efforts to comply with
the law would bar an award of punitive damages. It next discusses the Kolstad
decision and the parameters established for imposing or avoiding liability for
punitive damages. The article subsequently describes some of the recent decisions
examining Kolstad's good faith efforts defense, starting with decisions rendered by
the Tenth Circuit and including noteworthy cases from other circuit and district
courts. Finally, the article analyzes what employers must do, and avoid doing, to
ensure that they may take advantage of the Kolstad defense when facing litigation.
II.

CASES FORESHADOWING KOLSTAD'S "GOOD FAITH EFFORTS"

Kolstad did not articulate an entirely novel legal concept in announcing that
an employer may shield itself from vicarious liability for punitive damages by
showing that it has engaged in good faith efforts to comply with federal antidiscrimination laws. Before the Supreme Court's decision in Kolstad, several
circuit courts relied on similar analyses to determine an employer's punitive
damages liability in civil rights actions. Following is a brief discussion of these
prescient cases.

7. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 545-46.
8. The Court in Kolstad relied upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts which recognizes that it is
"improper ordinarily to award punitive damages against one who himself is personally innocent and
therefore liable only vicariously." Id. at 544.
9. The Court in Kolstad also concluded that relying upon the Restatement of Agency Scope of
Employment Rule to impose punitive damages under Title VII "would reduce the incentive for
employers to implement anti-discrimination programs." Id. at 544.
10. The Tenth Circuit aptly noted, in the context of a claim of discrimination asserted under the
Americans With Disabilities Act, that "Kolstad provides that no definitive standard for determining
what constitutes good faith compliance with the anti-discrimination requirements of the ADA." See
Equal Employment Opportunity Conm'n v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir.
1999).
11. See infra notes 13-29 and accompanying text.
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A Tenth Circuit decision, Baty v. Willamette Indus.,12 handed down two
months before Kolstad, utilized several of the same criteria courts have used since
Kolstad to determine whether an employer can escape liability for punitive
damages through prophylactic and remedial measures it takes to prevent, detect,
and respond to unlawful discrimination in the work place.
Patricia Baty ("Baty") sued Willamette Industries ("Willamette") for hostile
environment sexual harassment and retaliation. 3 Baty alleged that she had been
subject to almost constant sexual harassment from her male co-workers since she
began her employment in 1993.14 The harassment included sexually explicit
remarks, gestures, and graffiti targeted specifically at her.15 Baty also claimed that
she was terminated in retaliation for complaining to management about the
16
harassment.
At trial, the jury found for Baty on her hostile environment and
retaliation7 claims and awarded her economic, compensatory, and punitive
damages. 17
On appeal, Willamette argued that the evidence was insufficient to support
the punitive damages award.18 Referencing the statutory standard that punitive
damages are awarded in cases where an employer has acted with malice or
reckless indifference to an employee's federally protected rights, 19 the court
acknowledged that it had not yet had an occasion to determine the evidentiary
burden this standard imposed.2 0 For purposes of the case before it, the court
stated it would assume that Baty needed to show something more than intentional
discrimination, and found that she had carried this burden.21 The court cited three
factors leading it to conclude that a reasonable jury could find Willamette acted
with malice or reckless indifference: first, that management did not adequately
respond to plaintiff's complaints despite knowledge of serious problems with
harassment in the workplace; second, that Willamette conducted a sham
investigation in the face of such complaints; and third, that management actually
condoned the harassment.2" Thus, the court essentially held that the plaintiff was
entitled to punitive damages upon a showing that the employer failed to make
good faith efforts to investigate and respond to her complaints, and that high-level
management was aware of and implicitly condoned the offending conduct2
The Fifth Circuit reversed an award of punitive damages based upon similar

12. 172 F.3d 1232,1245 (10th Cir. 1999).

13. Id. at 1236.
14. Id. at 1236-38.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1239-40.
17. Id. at 1240.
18. Baty, 172 F.3d at 1240.
19. See the Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. §1981a(10)(1).
20. Baty, 172 F.3d at 1244.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1244-45.
23. See also Cadena v. Pacesetter, 224 F.3d 1203, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000) (analyzing pre-Kolstadcases
for examples of actions indicating employer engaged in good faith efforts, or failed to do so).
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reasoning. In Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare,24 the court found that (1) all of the
discriminatory acts in question were solely acts of a low-level supervisor, not of a
corporate officer; (2) the employer provided a handbook that expressly
established a policy of nondiscrimination and explained how employees could
complain about discriminatory practices to the company and distributed memos
throughout the workplace setting out the procedures for making complaints to
headquarters; (3) there was no evidence that the employer took any action
inconsistent with its nondiscrimination policy; and (4) the plaintiffs did not utilize
the complaint procedures in an attempt to notify the employer about the
discriminatory conduct of the supervisor, nor was there evidence that the
employer otherwise had notice of the discriminatory conduct.25 Such evidence
demonstrated that the employer did not act with malice or reckless disregard for
the law and, therefore, its good faith efforts did not warrant an award of punitive
damages. 26 Hence, in this case, the court found that plaintiffs were not entitled to
punitive damages because the evidence showed that the employer had a nondiscrimination policy (including complaint procedures), the employer adequately
publicized the policy, the plaintiff failed to follow the policy, and there was no
evidence that the employer engaged in conduct inconsistent with the policy.
These facts demonstrated the employer's good faith efforts.
In Kimzey v. Wal-Mart27 the Eighth Circuit upheld an award of punitive
damages based on evidence that both the plaintiff's supervisor and the store
manager took part in the sexual harassment, that the plaintiff's complaints to the
harassers and two other Wal-Mart managers went uninvestigated, and that other
female employees voiced similar complaints to which management failed to
respond - all in violation of Wal-Mart's anti-harassment policy.2 Once again, an
employer's adherence, or failure to adhere, to its own nondiscrimination policies is
determinative in a court's decision concerning the sufficiency of evidence
supporting an award of punitive damages. 29
Because the above-described decisions predate Kolstad, they tend to discuss
the appropriateness of imposing punitive liability in terms of the sufficiency of the
evidence demonstrating an employer's malice or reckless indifference to the
federally protected rights of its employees, rather than in terms of an employer's
good faith efforts to comply with federal nondiscrimination laws. The key factors
24. 90 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 1996).
25. Id. at 944.
26. The Eleventh Circuit similarly held that an employer was not liable for punitive damages under
the malice or reckless indifference standard where there was no evidence that senior company officials
were involved in or ratified the discriminatory conduct and there was evidence that the employer
publicized its anti-harassment policy, took plaintiff's complaints seriously, reprimanded the offending
supervisor, and offered to reinstate the plaintiff. See Reynolds v. CSX Transportation, 115 F.3d 860,
869 (11th Cir. 1997).
27. 107 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 1997).
28. Id. at 575-76.
29. See also Harris v. L&L Wings, 132 F.3d 978, 984 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing employer's failure to
investigate plaintiff's complaints combined with the company president's testimony disavowing
responsibility for preventing harassment in the workplace sufficient to find reckless disregard for
employee's rights).
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have remained remarkably consistent among cases decided before and after
Kolstad. These factors demonstrate that employers must provide evidence of the
following to raise a sufficient defense to vicarious liability for punitive damages:
* An employer must have a comprehensive nondiscrimination and
anti-harassment policy, including procedures for lodging complaints;
* The policy must be well publicized and readily available to
employees and management;
* The employer should conduct training regarding the policy,
available to all staff and mandatory for managers;
* The employer must thoroughly investigate complaints lodged
pursuant to the policy;
* The employer must take remedial measures where there is evidence
that the complained of conduct may have occurred;
* Senior management officials must be made aware that any
knowledge they have regarding possible discriminatory or harassing
conduct must be acted upon swiftly and in good faith.30
III. THE KOLSTAD DECISION
Before 1991, successful plaintiffs in Title VII cases were only entitled to
equitable remedies.31 Since Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
employers have faced additional "monetary" liability in the form of compensatory
and punitive damages32 for "intentional" violations of Title VII or the American's
with Disabilities Act (ADA).33 In Kolstad v. American DentalAssociation, 4 the
United States Supreme Court articulated the circumstances under which punitive
damages can be awarded for violations of Title VII or the ADA.
Carole Kolstad was one of two employees competing for a promotion in the

30. Because senior management officials may be viewed as the employer's proxy or alter ego, their
discriminating conduct may preclude a good faith efforts defense and provide a basis for imposing
direct liability on their discriminatory conduct for punitive damages. See infra notes 54-59 and
accompanying text.
31. Equitable remedies include economic relief such as back pay, front pay, reinstatement, interest
and injunctive relief.

32. Compensatory damages are awarded for emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental
anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary losses. Punitive damages are awarded to
punish the employer for committing acts of willful discrimination and to deter the employer and others
from engaging in such misconduct in the future. The 1991 Civil Rights Act caps the amount of
compensatory and punitive damages for which an employer may be liable, depending upon the
employer's size. The cap ranges from $50,000 for employers employing between 14 and 101 employees
to $300,000 for an employer with more than 500 employees. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1). Compensatory and punitive damages (known collectively as
"monetary" damages) are available in "disparate treatment" cases which require a showing of
intentional discrimination. Monetary damages are not available in "disparate impact" cases - cases
that do not require a showing of "intent" to discriminate on the part of the employer. I& at §
1981a(a)(1) To prevail in a disparate impact case, plaintiffs must show that the employer's policies or
practices disadvantaged a protected class of employees. Likewise, monetary damages are not available
in "mixed motive" cases in which the employer demonstrates that it would have taken the same
employment action absent the impermissible motivating factor. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), see also
Sheppard v. Riverview Nursing Center, 88 F.3d 1332, 1334 (4th Cir. 1996).

34. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
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Washington, D.C. office of the American Dental Association (Association).3 5
When the other employee, Tom Spangler, was selected over her, Kolstad sued the
Association in federal district court, alleging that she was passed over because of
her gender in violation of Title VII.36 The jury ruled in her favor, awarding her
$52,718 in back pay.37 The district court, however, refused to allow the jury to
consider an award of punitive damages because it didn't believe that Kolstad had
proved that she was not promoted because of her sex. 8 Kolstad appealed to the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming the district court should
have allowed the jury to consider her claim for punitive damages.39 A split panel
40
of the D.C. Circuit agreed with Kolstad and reversed the district court.
Following a rehearing en banc, a divided Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's decision not to allow the jury to determine punitive damages.4 '
The Supreme Court decided to hear the case to resolve the conflict among
the circuit courts concerning the circumstances under which punitive damages may
be awarded in Title VII cases. 4 2 In a 7-2 decision, the Court found that in the 1991
Act "Congress plainly sought to impose two standards of liability - one for
establishing a right to compensatory damages and another, higher standard that a
plaintiff must satisfy to qualify for a punitive award. 43 The higher standard, as
articulated by Congress, is a showing that the employer acted with "malice or

35. Id. at 530.
36. Id. at 531.
37. Id. at 532.
38. The district court observed that the only substantial evidence adduced by the plaintiff favorable
to her case was evidence that the male employee who received the promotion was "pre-selected", i.e.,
he was destined to get the job no matter who else applied, but that such pre-selection did not establish
that the plaintiff's gender was the motivating factor in pre-selecting the male candidate. Kolstad v.
American Dental Ass'n, 912 F. Supp. 13, 14 (D.D.C. 1996). The appellate court, sitting en banc,
pointed out that while evidence of pre-selection may be relevant to the question of discriminatory
intent, by itself pre-selection is neither illegal nor unusual. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d
958, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (hereinafter "KolstadII").
39. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 108 F.3d 1431 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (hereinafter "KolstadI").
40. Id. at 1439.
41. See Kolstad II, 139 F.3d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The en banc court agreed with the district court
that the issue of punitive damages was properly withheld from the jury because there was insufficient
evidence of "egregious misconduct" on the part of the employer. Id. at 965.
42. Before the Supreme Court decided Kolstad, lower courts applied various standards to
determine an employer's liability for punitive damages. The majority of circuits required proof of
something more than mere intentional discrimination. See e.g., Emnel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 95
F.3d 627, 636 (7th Cir. 1996)(stating that punitive damages standard is a "higher hurdle" then that for
underlying discrimination); Karcher v. Emerson Elec., 94 F.3d 502, 509 (8th Cir. 1996)(same); Turic v.
Holland Hospitality, 85 F.3d 1211, 1216 (6th Cir. 1996)(same); McKinnon v. Kwong Wah Restaurant,
83 F.3d 498, 508 (1st Cir. 1996)(same). Several circuits required evidence of egregious or outrageous
conduct before holding employers liable in punitive damages for the conduct of their employees. See,
e.g., Harris v. L&L Wings, 132 F.3d 978, 982 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Punitive damages are an 'extraordinary
remedy,' to be reserved for egregious cases"); Ngo v. Reno Hilton Resort Corp., 140 F.3d 1299, 1304
(9th Cir. 1998) (eligibility for punitive damages requires evidence of conduct more egregious than
intentional discrimination). However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals determined that nothing
more than proof of intentional discrimination was required to submit the issue of punitive liability to
the jury. Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1997)(no additional evidence needed
for punitive damages).
43. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526,534 (1999).
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reckless indifference" to the employee's federally protected rights. 44 In Kolstad,
the Court attempted to give life to this standard by exploring both the legislative
intent and historical meaning to the terms "malice" and "reckless indifference."
A.

EgregiousnessNot Required

The Supreme Court rejected the "egregiousness" standard previously
adopted by several Circuits to determine the propriety of punitive damages.!5 The
Court explained that while egregious or outrageous acts may serve as proof of
malice, the presence or absence of egregious conduct is not determinative of
whether punitive damages should be awarded in a given case.4 In the Court's
view, Congress specifically chose to use the terms "malice" and "reckless
indifference" as those terms were used and applied in a 1983 Supreme Court case,
Smith v. Wade.47 In Wade, the Court held that a jury could assess punitive
damages without a showing of actual malice or evil intent in a § 1983 civil rights
action."s Kolstad, therefore, effectively placed the bar for imposing punitive
damages on employers in civil rights actions at a threshold showing of reckless
indifference.
B.

The Reckless Indifference Threshold

Relying on case law and historical sources in analyzing the term reckless
indifference, the Court concluded a plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer
discriminated "in the face of a perceived risk that its actions [would] violate
federal law to be liable in punitive damages., 49 The Court underscored that both
malice and reckless indifference pertain to the employer's knowledge that it may be
acting in violation of federal law, not its awareness that it is engaging in
discrimination.50 This distinction is important because today it is difficult for any
employer to claim either: a) that it is unaware of federal anti-discrimination laws,
or b) that such ignorance is not evidence itself of an employer's reckless
indifference to an employee's federally protected rights.
C.

Exceptions to the "PerceivedRisk" Standard

The Court indirectly acknowledged that its newly articulated standard for
imposing punitive damages is met upon a showing of intentional discrimination. It
did so by identifying the limited circumstances in which intentional discrimination
does not give rise to punitive damages liability under the perceived risk standard.
44. Id. (citingto 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)).
45. Id. at 534-35.
46. See lacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 1999) (interpreting Kolstad's holding with
regard to egregious conduct).
47. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 535 (discussing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 536. Thus, a plaintiff must meet the "perceived risk" standard to show reckless

indifference on the part of the employer.
50. Id. at 535 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 536-37.
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The Court set out four scenarios in which an employer would not meet the
standard of "discrimination in the face of a perceived risk" of violating federal
rights: (a) where the employer is unaware of the relevant federal prohibition (i.e.,
ignorance); 2 (b) where the employer discriminates with the distinct belief that its
discrimination is lawful (i.e., mistake of law); (c) where the employer may
reasonably believe that its discrimination satisfies a bona fide occupational
qualification ("BFOQ") defense or some other statutory exception to liability; or
(d) where the plaintiff's theory of discrimination is novel or otherwise poorly
recognized 3 Perhaps because the Supreme Court recognized that these defenses
to the perceived risk standard would shield an insignificant number of employers
from punitive liability, 54 it went on to discuss other avenues by which employers
may avoid liability for punitive damages.
D. Direct Versus Vicarious Liabilityfor PunitiveDamages
Integral to analyzing liability for punitive damages under the perceived risk
standard is determining whether the employer itself discriminated in the face of a
perceived risk that its actions might violate federal law.55 Under such6
circumstances, employer liability for punitive damages appears to be direct!
Kolstad supports this conclusion, albeit indirectly, in its discussion of the issues to
be considered on remand. 7 The Court specifies that if, on remand, it is

52. Though not yet tested, ignorance of well established civil rights laws is likely to be a difficult
exception to meet without implying "reckless indifference" on the part of the employer to federal laws
- by virtue of the fact that the employer must have affirmatively attempted to remain ignorant or
intentionally failed to inquire about laws that clearly apply to it.
53. Kolstad,527 U.S. at 536-37.
54. For an elaboration of the narrow scope of these exceptions, see the D.C. Circuit Court's
discussion in KolstadIL 139 F.3d at 967-68.
55. See Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson, 212 F.3d 493, 516 (9th Cir. 2000)(suggesting that a
determination of the status of the malfeasing employee(s) is crucial to the outcome of the Kolstad
punitive liability analysis, because the good faith defense potentially is available where the conduct is
undertaken by an agent and liability is vicarious, while it is not available for the acts of a principal or
other sufficiently senior executive and liability is direct).
56. Judge Tatel, writing for the dissent in Kolstad I, notes that "if the person discriminating is the
same as the employer-in a sole proprietorship, for example-there is no difference between the
employer's awareness of its legal obligations and the employee's" [thus, the employer acted in the face
of a perceived risk of violating federal law and is therefore directly liable in punitive damages]. Judge
Tatel further illuminates direct versus vicarious liability by observing that "where a gap exists in the
agency relationship between the agent and the entity being held liable, i.e., where the employee making
the hiring or firing decision does not constitute the employer's entire decision-making apparatus,the
punitive damages inquiry requires the jury to examine the employer's awareness of the law". Kolstad
HI, 139 F.3d at 974 (emphasis added). In other words, where the offending employee "constitutes the
employer's entire decision-making apparatus" the employee and employer are one in the same and the
employer is susceptible to direct liability for punitive damages. Id.
Other courts have noted implicitly and explicitly that Kolstad did nothing to change the
established rule that an individual, such as a principal, who is sufficiently senior in a corporation, must
be treated as the corporation's proxy for purposes of liability, and imputing the employee's
discriminatory conduct to the employer is unnecessary. See Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson, 212 F.3d
493, 516-17 (9th Cir. 2000); Lowery v. Circuit City, 206 F.3d 431, 442 (4th Cir. 2000) ("If it cannot be
said that a principal of the employer actually engaged in the discriminatory conduct at issue, the
plaintiff must offer evidence sufficient to impute liability for punitive damages from the individual who
did so to the employer").
57. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 546.
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determined that the executive director, the Association's highest-level official,
made the discriminatory decision not to promote the plaintiff, then the sole
question concerning the employer's liability for punitive damages is whether the
executive director acted with malice or reckless indifference, i.e., whether he
discriminated in the face of a perceived risk that his actions violate federal law.5 8
If, on the other hand, the determination on remand is that a lower level manager
actually made the discriminatory promotion decision, the court must examine not
only (1) whether the manager acted in the face of a perceived risk that he was
violating federal law, but also (2) whether the manager was acting in a managerial
capacity and in the scope of his employment, and (3) whether the good faith
efforts defense has been met.5 9 The Supreme Court did not raise these last two
issues when discussing the inquiry to be made if the executive director was the
actual decision maker because the agency and good faith efforts analyses are not
necessary in cases where the employer has direct, rather than vicarious liability for
punitive damages. 6
1.

The Agency Analysis

The law of Agency governs whether the act of an employee may be imputed
to the employer, resulting in vicarious liability to the employer. 61 For this reason,
the Kolstad Court took some pains to set out the type of agency relationships
under which employee conduct may be imputed to the employer. 62 If the
existence of such an agency relationship cannot be established, the employer
cannot be held liable for punitive damages. 63
Citing the Restatement (Second) of Agency, the Supreme Court addressed64
the proper legal standards for imputing vicarious liability for punitive damages.
An agent's misconduct can be imputed to the principal for purposes of awarding
punitive damages if: (a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the
act; (b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him; (c)
the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of
employment; or (d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or
approved the act. 6' While it did not explore further the various agency principles
it cited, the Court did shed some light on what constitutes an employee serving in
a managerial capacity. "In making this determination, the court should review the
type of authority that the employer has given to the employee, the amount of
discretion that the employee has in what is done and how it is accomplished." 66

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Passantino,212 F.3d at 516-17 (analyzing Kolstad's applicability to high-level management

officials).
61.
62.
63.
64.

See Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 539-41.
Id. at 54243.
Id. at 541-42.
Id. at 542-43.

65. IM.
66. Id. at 543 (citations omitted).
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The Court summarized by stating that an employee acting in a managerial
capacity "must be important, but perhaps need not be the employer's
top
67
capacity."
managerial
a
in
acting
be
to
directors,
or
officers,
management,
The Court also adopted the Restatement of Agency's "scope of
employment" requirement, which provides that even intentional torts are within
the scope of an agent's employment if: (1) the conduct is the kind the employee is
employed to perform, (2) the conduct occurs substantially within the authorized
time and space limits, and (3) the conduct is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose
to serve the employer.6s Citing the Restatement, the Court explained that as long
as these criteria are met, an employee acts within the scope of his employment
even if he engages in acts "specifically forbidden"
by the employer and uses
69
"forbidden means of accomplishing the results."

Even where the employee who engaged in the intentional discrimination is
found to be "acting in a managerial capacity within the scope of his employment,"
Kolstad provides one last opportunity for an employer to avoid vicarious liability
for punitive damages by allowing the employer to demonstrate that it made "good
faith efforts to comply with Title VII." 70
E.

Kolstad's Good faith efforts Defense

Recognizing that the punitive damages liability standard dictated by agency
law gives employers less incentive to educate themselves and their employees
about anti-discrimination laws,71 the Kolstad Court articulated a "good faith
efforts" defense to the imposition of punitive damages. 72 In a closely divided (5-4)
decision, the Court ruled that even if a plaintiff satisfies the criteria described
above - that is, demonstrates that a manager or supervisor engaged in unlawful
discrimination with the knowledge that those actions might violate the law - the
plaintiff cannot collect punitive damages from the employer (as an entity) if the
manager's actions "are contrary to the employer's good faith efforts to comply
with Title VII" 73 The Court explained that such an approach was consistent with
Title VII's objective of motivating employers to detect and prevent Title VII
67. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 543.
68. Id. at 543-44 (citations omitted).
69. IdL at 544.
70. Id. at 545. The Court made it clear that the so-called "good faith efforts" defense is available as
a defense to vicarious liability on the part of the employer, and made no mention of its availability in
cases of directliability. Id. ("We agree that, in the punitive damages context, an employer may not be
vicariously liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents where these
decisions are contrary to the employer's 'good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII") (citing to
Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added)). This supports the view some courts have taken that intentional discrimination on the part of
senior company officials can result in direct liability to the employer for punitive damages. Id.
71. The Court noted that the agency principles it cited "reduce the incentive for employers to
implement anti-discrimination programs. In fact, such a rule would likely exacerbate concerns among
employers that section 1981a's "malice" and "reckless indifference" standard penalizes those
employers who educate themselves and their employees on Title VII's prohibitions." Kolstad, 527 U.S.
at 544.
72 Id. at 544-45.

73. Id. at 545 (quoting Kolstad I, 139 F.3d at 974) (Tatel, I., dissenting).
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violations.74 The principles underlying common law limitations on vicarious
liability - that it is improper to award punitive damages against one who himself is
personally innocent - further informed the Court's decision.7s
In explicating the meaning of "good faith efforts", the Court indicated that
an employer demonstrates that it "never acted in reckless disregard of federally
protected rights" where it has undertaken good faith efforts at Title VII
compliance.7 6 The Court did not otherwise delineate the parameters of the good
faith efforts defense.77 The remainder of this article focuses on how the lower
courts have interpreted this exception to an employer's vicarious liability for
punitive damages.
IV. TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
A.

EEOC v. Wal-Mart

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was one of the first circuit courts to
78
analyze what an employer must do to satisfy Kolstad's good faith efforts defense.
In Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,79 the Court
considered the defense in the context of a claim of discrimination asserted under
the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). s° Eduardo Amaro ("Amaro"),
was employed by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("Wal-Mart") in its receiving
department.81 Amaro was hearing impaired and, therefore, sometimes needed the
assistance of an interpreter when attending meetings and training sessions.82 A
few years after he was hired, he left a mandatory training session because the
video tape used in the session was not "closed captioned" and an interpreter was
not present. 3 He refused to attend the session even after his supervisor offered to
have a co-worker "finger-spell" for him.84 The next day, management decided to

74. Id.
75. Id. at 544 (citing to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS).
76. Id. (citing to 139 F.3d at 974 (Tatel, J., dissenting) and Harris v. L&L Wings, 132 F.3d 978, 98384 (4th Cir. 1997) for the proposition that, in some cases, the existence of a written policy instituted in
good faith has operated as a total bar to employer liability for punitive damages and that the institution
of a written sexual harassment policy has gone a long way towards dispelling any claim about the
employer's "reckless" or "malicious" state of mind).
77. In writing Kolstad, the Court appeared to rely in large part upon Judge Tatel's dissenting
opinion in Kolstad II. The analysis follows the same framework set out in Tatel's dissent, and the
opinion cites Tatel's dissent on several occasions. Judge Tatel's dissent provides some specific
examples of actions an employer might undertake in making good faith efforts to comply with Title
VII, including: hiring staff and managers "sensitive" to Title VII responsibilities; requiring effective
EEO training; and requiring objective hiring and promotion standards. Kolstad 11, 139 F.3d at 974.
78. The Kolstad decision was rendered on June 22, 1999. The Tenth Circuit decided the EEOC v.
Wal-Mart case on August 23,1999.
79. 187 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1999).
80. Id.
81. 1d at 1243.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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transfer Amaro to the maintenance department to perform janitorial workY.
Although he asked that an interpreter explain the reasons for the transfer, his
initial request was denied8 6 The reasons were later explained in a handwritten
note but Amaro insisted that Wal-Mart use an interpreter! 7 He was then
suspended after he threatened to file a complaint with the EEOC.88 Following the
suspension, an interpreter was hired to explain the transfer to Amaro but he still
refused to accept the transfer and his employment was immediately terminated. 89
Amaro sued Wal-Mart claiming its actions violated the ADA.9' He won
$3,527.29 in compensatory damages and convinced the jury to punish Wal-Mart
with an award of punitive damages in the amount of $75,000.91 Wal-Mart asked
the Tenth Circuit to throw out the punitive damages award for a number of
reasons, one of which included the argument that the actions of the managers who
supervised Amaro were contrary to company policy. 92 Wal-Mart specifically
argued that it could not be held liable for punitive damages because it circulated
an ADA compliance manual and the actions of Amaro's supervisors violated the
rules in the manual. 93 Wal-Mart also relied on a company policy describing
equality and respect for the individual. 94 The Tenth Circuit was not convinced.
The Court upheld the award of punitive damages because Wal-Mart had not
taken the necessary steps to educate its work force about what was required and
prohibited by the ADA. 95 The Court observed that Amaro's immediate
supervisor testified during her deposition that she was not aware of any law
requiring employers to offer reasonable accommodations until three years after
Amaro was terminated. 96 She also testified that she had received no training
about disability discrimination. 97 Further, the personnel manager responsible for
training at the store where Amaro worked testified that during her seven years of
employment as a manager, she had received no training in employment
discrimination or the requirements of the ADA, had never discussed the ADA
with the employees whom she supervised, and did not have a copy of Wal-Mart's
ADA handbook. 98 The Court characterized the testimony of Wal-Mart's
management personnel as reflecting a "broadfailure" on the part of Wal-Mart to
educate its employees about the requirements of the ADA and to prevent

85. WalmartStores, Inc., 187 F.3d at 1243.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1244.
88. Id.
89. Id. Wal-Mart actually rehired Amaro in June 1993, approximately five months after his
employment had been terminated. Nevertheless, the EEOC filed suit on his behalf in October 1993.
90. Id at 1244.
91. WalmartStores, Inc., 187 F.3d at 1244.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1246.
94. Id. at 1249.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. WalmartStores, Inc., 187 F.3d at 1249.
98. Id.
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discrimination in the work place.99 Accordingly, Kolstad's good faith efforts
defense could not shield Wal-Mart from liability for punitive damages.
B.

Knowlton v. Teltrust

One week before the Tenth Circuit rendered its decision in EEOC v. WalMart, it also relied on Kolstad when considering a claim for punitive damages in a
case alleging sexual harassment. In Knowlton v. Teltrust Phones, Inc.,1°° the
employer did not specifically assert that its good faith efforts barred an award of
punitive damages. However, the case illustrates the type of conduct which
demonstrates a clear failure to exercise good faith efforts to comply with Title VII.
Ms. Pierre Knowlton ("Knowlton") worked as a sales representative for
Teltrust Phones, Inc. ("Teltrust"). 101 In September 1992, she complained to
Teltrust's management that her supervisor, Mark Neihart ("Neihart"), had been
sexually harassing her since she was hired in October 1990.' 2 Knowlton alleged
that Neihart subjected her to various acts of harassment, including but not limited
to: vulgar language, sexually explicit jokes, and repeated propositions for sex. 03
Because of Knowlton's complaint, Teltrust transferred Neihart to another position
within the company' °4 However, Knowlton claimed that she feared retaliation
from Neihart and, therefore, resigned from Teltrust. 05s She later sued Teltrust for
sexual harassment.1t 6
Following a trial, Knowlton was awarded compensatory damages in the
amount of $75,000.107 The judge who presided over the trial, however, refused to
allow the jury to consider whether Knowlton was entitled to recover punitive
damages from Teltrust.1° He decided that Knowlton had not offered enough
evidence to demonstrate that Teltrust had recklessly disregarded her rights under
Title VII. 0 9 The Tenth Circuit disagreed.
In finding that the jury should have been allowed to consider Knowlton's
claim for punitive damages, the Court focused on the fact that based on the
testimony of other Teltrust employees, Teltrust's management was well aware of
Neihart's alleged inappropriate conduct directed towards other female employees
at the time Knowlton lodged her complaint.1
One female co-worker testified
that prior to terminating her employment, Neihart "pinned her up against a wall
and made a sexual advance." ' Although she complained to the Chief Financial
99. Id.
100. 189 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 1999).

101. Id. at 1180-81.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.

105. Id.
106. Knowlton, 189 F.3d at 1180-81.
107. Id. at 1181.

108. Id. at 1186.
109. Id.

110. Id. at 1186-87.
111. Id. at 1187.
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Officer and the harassment stopped for a while, it reoccurred when the Chief
Financial Officer was terminated from Teltrust.12 The Chief Financial Officer
also testified that she had spoken several times about Neihart's inappropriate
behavior to the President and that he discounted the complaints noting that "[t]he
women in this company are always too emotional. '1 Further evidence included
testimony from Neihart's immediate supervisor who also claimed that he spoke
with the President and other members of management about Neihart's
inappropriate behavior before Knowlton made her complaint. 114 Her immediate
supervisor also acknowledged that he had observed Neihart's use of foul
language. 15 He chastised Neihart by stating "shame on you, that is very
inappropriate," but never formally reprimanded Neihart for his behavior. 116 The
Court also characterized management's response to Knowlton's complaint as
"unresponsive" because even though Neihart was transferred to another position
within the company, Knowlton would still come into contact with him when
performing her job duties. 1 7 The court concluded that the trial court should have
allowed the jury to consider Knowlton's claim for punitive damages because of
management's unmistakable awareness that Neihart was creating a hostile work
environment and because Neihart's transfer did not effectively prevent further
contact between Neihart and Knowlton. 18
C. Deters v. Equifax
In Deters v. Equifax Credit Information Services, Inc. ("Equifax"),119 the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed an employer's attempt to assert the
good faith efforts defense where the manager designated to enforce the company's
anti-discrimination and harassment policies actually observed the alleged
harassment.Y° The Plaintiff, Sharon Deters ("Deters"), worked for Equifax in its
Lenexa, Kansas office from August 1994 through October 1995.121 During that
time period, she performed various administrative duties for the Assistant2
Department Managers ("ADMs"), who supervised the Equifax debt collectors.1
Jim Taylor ("Taylor") was the General Manager of the Lenexa office.123 His
responsibilities included hiring, firing, discipline and approving salaries for the
entire staff.124 Equifax also had designated Taylor as the person responsible for
implementing its human resources policies, including its sexual harassment
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Knowlton, 189 F.3d at 1187.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Knowlton, 189 F.3d at 1187.
202 F.3d 1262 (10thCir. 2000).
Id. at 1267.
Id. at 1266.
Id.
Id.
Equifax,202 F.3d at 1267.
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Deters claimed that, at some time during her employment, she was subjected
to harassment by two ADMs, a debt collector and her supervisor.2 6 The alleged
harassment by the ADMs included twisting her arm, calling her a f'ing B, telling
crude jokes, leering at her, and making bets with her supervisor about who was
going to sleep with her first. 27 Deters also claimed her supervisor would call her
home at all hours of the night and ask her to go out even after she told him that
she was engaged, grabbed and kissed her on one occasion, and stared at her chest
and asked her if she wanted to take her jacket off.128 Deters alleged that the debt
collector would often touch or squeeze her hand and state, "I love redheads."1 29
He also pushed her skirt up and rubbed her leg on one occasion before she could
fight him off. 3°

Deters alleged that each time she complained to Taylor about the
131
harassment, he told her that he would take care of it.
She also alleged that he
told her that the ADMs and debt collectors were revenue producers; that she
needed to remember she was a "non-revenue person," that the harassing conduct
was a by-product of the personality type necessary to be a collector, and that the
collector who harassed her was just being friendly. 32 Deters later quit her job and
sued Equifax under Title VII.133 Based on the evidence presented during trial, the
jury initially awarded Deters $5,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in
punitive damages!'4 The court reduced the punitive damages award to
$295,000.131
Equifax argued that the punitive damages award should be thrown out
because Taylor's conduct was contrary to its sexual harassment policy. 136 In other
words, his alleged failure to respond adequately to Deters' complaints was
contrary to Equifax's good faith efforts to comply with Title VII.137 When
considering this argument, the court focused on the fact that Equifax had
125. Id.

126. Id. at 1266-1267.
127. Id.
128. Id.

129. Id.
130. Equifax, 202 F.3d at 1267.

131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1262.
Id. at 1266.

135. Id.

136. Equifax, 202 F.3d at 1270. Equifax also argued that Taylor did not act with the state of mind
(malice or recklessness) necessary to support an award of punitive damages when he responded to

Deters' complaints and, therefore, it should not be required to pay Deters any punitive damages. Id. at
1268-1269. As support for the argument, it claimed that Taylor was unaware of the extent of the
harassment suffered by Deters and that he merely failed to communicate effectively with his staff. Id.
The Court rejected this argument, finding that Deters presented ample evidence during the trial that

she had consistently complained to Taylor and that Taylor personally observed some of the harassment
directed at Deters. Id. at 1269. The Court also relied upon the evidence of Taylor's alleged failure to
respond to her complaints, as well as his efforts to explain and/or excuse the harassing conduct and
thereby protect the "revenue producers." Id.

137. Equifax, 202 F.3d at 1270.
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designated Taylor as the person responsible for implementing and/or enforcing its
sexual harassment policy in the Lenexa office. 3 Because of the designation, the
court concluded that Equifax was directly liable for Taylor's alleged inadequate
response to Deters' complaints.139 Equifax, therefore, could not assert that its
good faith efforts to comply with Title VII, through its policies or otherwise,
prevented it from being held responsible for paying Deters the punitive damages
that were based on Taylor's conduct. 14° The court recognized that Kolstad's good
faith efforts defense is unavailable in situations where a manager, who knew or
should have known about the alleged harassment, is designated as responsible for
implementing the company's anti-harassment policy and fails to respond
adequately to an employee's complaints about the harassment .
D. Cadena v. Pacesetter
The most recent Tenth Circuit decision to construe the adequacy of an
employer's good faith efforts is Cadena v. The Pacesetter Corp.142 The Plaintiff,
Lynn Cadena ("Cadena"), had been employed as a telemarketer in Pacesetter's
Lenexa, Kansas office. 43 She claimed that several months after she was hired, one
of the telemarketing managers, Charles Bauersfeld ("Bauersfeld"), subjected her
to a "steady barrage of severe sexual harassment."' 44 Some of the alleged
harassment included the following: a statement by Bauersfeld that Cadena needed
to go out with him "so that he could have more wet dreams about her", asking her
if she was getting enough sex when she was having a problem performing her job
duties, and asking her to show her breasts to a co-worker in order to "get him
going". When Cadena became upset with his statements and behavior, he
allegedly told her: "Honey, I didn't mean anything by it. You know, you are one
of my favorite sweethearts., 145 Cadena also alleged that Bauersfeld physically
harassed her while she was conducting her telemarketing duties by massaging her
lower back, putting his arms around her, touching her hair and the front of her
1
body.
Following the "you are one of my favorite sweethearts" statement, Cadena
reported the manager's conduct to one of the other managers who responded by
telling her that "there is nothing nobody can do about it.' ' 147 He also allegedly told
her that the General Manager of the Lenexa office and individuals at corporate
headquarters were aware of the manager's conduct but that nothing could be done

138. Id.at 1270-71.
139. Id.

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
224 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1206.

144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id. at 1206-07.
Id.
Id. at 1207.
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because the manager "made too much money for Pacesetter."' 14 He also told
Cadena that if she was unhappy with the situation, she should simply consider
quitting. 49 Cadena attempted to contact the General Manager of the office but
was unable to reach him. She later decided to resign from her position' 50
Cadena's complaint was not brought to the attention of the General
Manager until after she resigned.' 5' He responded by questioning Bauersfeld
about his conduct and then interviewing Cadena, who informed him of all of the
problems she had experienced while working with Bauersfeld . 5 The General
Manager responded by trying to downplay the manager's actions. He also offered
Cadena a raise if she would return to work and drop her sexual harassment
complaint. 153 Cadena later submitted a letter to the General Manager describing
the incidents of sexual harassment, the company's failure to address the problem,
and indicated that she did not intend to return to work.'- 4 He called her again and
advised her that Bauersfeld had been written up and that he would be fired if
another incident occurred. 55 Nevertheless, Cadena did not return to work and
instead sued Pacesetter for sexual harassment.1 6 Following her trial, the jury
awarded her $50,000 in compensatory damages and $700,000 in punitive
damages. 157 The entire damage award was later reduced by the district court to
$300,000." s
Pacesetter appealed the jury's verdict on punitive damages to the Tenth
Circuit and argued that Bauersfeld's alleged harassing conduct should not be
imputed to Pacesetter because the conduct was contrary to Pacesetter's good faith
efforts to prevent sexual harassment and comply with Title VII.15 9 In support of
its argument, Pacesetter argued that it maintained a strong policy against sexual
harassment and that it adequately trained its employees to comply with the policy
and Title VIIVO° The court rejected Pacesetter's argument based upon the trial
and deposition testimony of its own managers.' 6' Although the manager
responsible for conducting sexual harassment training testified at trial that she
discussed the topic of sexual harassment at meetings with her co-workers on a
monthly basis, her testimony was contradicted by another telemarketing manager
who testified that no such monthly training sessions occurred.' 62 The manager

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Cadena, 224 F.3d at 1207.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1207.
Id.

154. Cadena, 224 F.3d at 1207.

155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

159. Id. at 1209.
160. Cadena, 224 F.3d at 1210.

161. Id.
162. Id.
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responsible for conducting sexual harassment training also testified during her
deposition that she thought a male supervisor could not commit sexual harassment
if he exposed his genitalia to a female subordinate or grabbed her breasts "so long
as he apologized after the incident."''
The court also relied on evidence
presented at trial which suggested that Pacesetter knew about Bauersfeld's
harassing conduct and simply failed to take any action to stop it.164 Under these
facts, the court determined that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to
conclude that Pacesetter did not make good efforts to comply with Title VII and,
therefore, was not entitled to a judgment in its favor on punitive damages. 165
V.
A.

OTHER FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS
Circuit Court Decisions

The Fifth Circuit was also one of the first circuit courts to address whether
an employer's good faith efforts complied with the standard announced in
Kolstad.' 66 In Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,167 the jury awarded
plaintiff $100,000 in punitive damages in a suit brought under Title VII and 42
U.S.C. § 1981.' 6 The plaintiff, a white female, claimed that Wal-Mart terminated
her employment because she was dating an African-American male. 69 The
district court, however, entered judgment as a matter of law for Wal-Mart on
plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. 170 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the
district court's ruling, reinstating punitive damages in the amount of $75,000.'
However, the Fifth Circuit also granted a rehearing on the
issue of punitive
17 2
damages because of the Supreme Court's decision in Kolstad.
Upon rehearing, the Fifth Circuit held that the Kolstad decision was not such
a sudden shift in the law as to require submission of additional evidence.1 73 The
parties were, however, allowed to brief the issue of punitive damages. 174 Because
the district court considered the case based on law that the Fifth Circuit deemed to
be "in line" with the Kolstad decision, the Fifth Circuit upheld its ruling that the
managers acted with the requisite malice or reckless disregard of federal rights. 75
The question remained whether, after the Kolstad decision, Wal-Mart could be

163. Id. at 1210.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-mart Stores, Inc., 188 F.3d 278 (5th
Cir. 1999), was decided on August 31, 1999, just over two months after the Supreme Court issued the
Kolstad decision. See supranote 3.

167. Deffenbaugh, 188 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 1999).
168. Id.280-81.
169. See the prior decision at 156 F.3d 581, 586 (5th Cir. 1998).
170. Id.
171. Deffenbaugh, 188 F.3d at 286.

172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 284.
Id.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 285-286.
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vicariously liable despite its good faith efforts to comply with federal law. 176 The
court found that Wal-Mart's minimal investigation and simple procedure of
encouraging employees to report complaints was not enough to establish the good
faith defense. 7n Further, the plaintiff produced evidence at trial that her District
Manager "left uncontradicted" a statement made during a lunch meeting by the
Plaintiff's prior supervisor that she would "never move up with the company being
associated with a black man., 178 The Court concluded that this additional
evidence in combination with the District Manager's implicit ratification of the
supervisor's statement and an ineffective response to the Plaintiff's complaints
gave the jury "wide latitude" to infer that Wal-Mart's anti-discrimination policy
was "poorly enforced., 179 As a result, Wal-Mart's good faith efforts defense was
rejected and it was ordered to pay $75,000 in punitive damages."o
In Blackmon v. Pinkerton Security & Investigative Services,""1 the district
court entered judgment as a matter of law and withdrew a punitive damages
award of $100,000 granted to the plaintiff by a jury.' 82 The evidence at trial
demonstrated that Plaintiff was subjected to frequent sexual harassment while
employed as a security guard. 8 3 She later suffered adverse employment actions
after she complained about the harassment.'8 4 Further, the evidence showed that
the investigation into her complaints was woefully inadequate.'s On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit remanded the case for reinstatement of the punitive damages
award, holding that the plaintiff had met the standards for punitive damages on
her Title VII claim as set forth in Kolstad.'86 Although the employer did not assert
the good faith efforts defense, the case clearly illustrates a lack of good faith by
the employer. Specifically, the court held that Pinkerton had:
[Alcted with malice and reckless indifference to [the plaintiff's] federally protected

rights when it: (1) failed to investigate [the plaintiff's] complaints and institute
prompt remedial action even after appellant complained to three successive levels of
supervision; (2) repeatedly retaliated against her for complaining of sexual

harassment by reprimanding her, demoting her, fostering an environment in which
her co-workers were openly hostile to her, and finally terminating her; (3) attempted
to escape legal liability by soliciting information against appellant to prove she
caused the harassment; and (4) attempted to escape legal87liability for terminating
[the plaintiff] by firing another employee at the same time.
The court clarified that including information about complaining employees

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 286.
Deffenbaugh, 188 F.3d at 286.
Id. at 280.
Id. at 286.
Id.
182 F.3d 629 (8th Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 635.
Id.

185. Id.

186. Id. at 637.
187. Blackmon, 182 F.3d at 636.
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1
in investigations is not necessarily evidence of malice or reckless indifference. 83
However, the court found that Pinkerton "did not conduct an even-handed, good'
faith investigation, in which information about [the plaintiff] was but a part."189
Instead, the investigation "consisted almost exclusively of looking for unfavorable
information about [the plaintiff]." 1' 9 Considering the fact that the company had
conducted a "sham" investigation and otherwise failed to comply with Title VII,
plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages under Kolstad 19'
In Lowery v. Circuit City Stores,19 the Fourth Circuit presented a thorough
analysis of nearly every aspect of the Supreme Court's decision in Kolstad. In
determining whether the punitive damages awarded against Circuit City should be
vacated, the appellate court noted that the evidence established: (1) that the
supervisor (Ms. Turner) responsible for the challenged employment action (failure
to promote) intentionally refused to promote plaintiff Lowery because of her race
(African-American) in the face of a perceived risk that doing so would violate
federal law (Turner had taken a training course offered by the employer regarding
federal anti-discrimination laws); 93 (2) that Turner served Circuit City in a
managerial capacity (Turner managed a department with 21 employees, she had
authority and full discretion in hiring and promotion decisions, and she had full
discretion in organizing her department in any way she wanted); 194 and (3) that
Turner was acting within the scope of her employment in refusing to promote
Lowery (making promotion decisions is the type of conduct Circuit City hired
Turner to perform, she acted on her promotion decisions during working hours,
and her promotion decisions were undertaken, at least in part, for the purpose of

serving Circuit City). 195

The Fourth Circuit went on to explain that it would nonetheless vacate the
jury's punitive damages award if it concluded that a reasonable juror could only
find that Circuit City engaged in good faith efforts to comply with § 1981.196 The
court pointed out that the good faith exception relies on the notion that the
existence and enforcement of an anti-discrimination policy shows that the
employer itself never acted in reckless disregard of federally protected rights.1 7
Circuit City produced evidence showing it had a comprehensive
nondiscrimination policy that provided three distinct avenues by which employees
could complain about discriminatory conduct. Circuit City also demonstrated that
it educated its workforce on this policy by including the policy in its employee
handbook, by distributing posters on the policy to all of its stores, by conducting

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 636 & n.7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 637.
206 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 443.

194. Id. at 444.
195. Id. at 445.
196. Id.
197. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol36/iss3/4

20

Powell and Crane: Complying with the Mandate of Kolstad: Are Your Good Faith Effort

2001]

COMPLYING WITH THE MANDATE OFKOLSTAD

611

employee training on the policy, and by requiring every manager and supervisor
to attend a week-long training which included education on federal antidiscrimination laws. 98
The court then catalogued the evidence undermining Circuit City's claim
that it made good faith efforts to comply with federal anti-discrimination laws.' 99
First, the court underscored that there was evidence that two of Circuit City's "top
executives" harbored racial animosity towards African-Americans. 2 ° Second,
there was evidence that one of the top executives "buried" internal reports
indicating a lack of promotional opportunities for minorities and women and that
a sizable number of Circuit City associates believe that minorities are not treated
the same as white associates. 20 1 Third, the court pointed to the testimony of
African-American associates that they feared retaliation by Circuit City if they
utilized the complaint procedures outlined in the anti-discrimination policy and
that those who had complained felt they had been intimidated by Circuit City's
management in response.202 Finally, the court pointed to the subjective and
unstructured promotion system at Circuit City as evidence of a tool used by
management to effect its disparate promotion policy.20 3 Based on the conflicting
evidence of Circuit City's good faith efforts, the court was not persuaded that a
reasonable juror could only conclude that Circuit City engaged in 2°good faith
efforts to comply with § 1981. Thus, the punitive damages award stood.
The Eighth Circuit has also assessed the viability of an employer's good faith
efforts defense. In Ogden v. Wax Works,20 s plaintiff Ogden prevailed at trial on
her claims of sexual harassment and retaliation. 2 6 On appeal, Wax Works argued,
inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's award of punitive
damages.2 7 As evidence of its good faith efforts, Wax Works pointed to its
written sexual harassment policy and its policy of encouraging employees with
complaints to contact the home office.2°s The appellate court determined that
such evidence did not suffice, as a matter of law, to establish good faith efforts0
The court went on to describe the evidence it believed impugned Wax

198. Lowery, 206 F.3d at 445.
199. Id. at 445-46.
200. Id. One of the top executives was the Vice President of Corporate Planning, who allegedly told
Lowery she would do better at a company that was more receptive to minorities and women and
indicated that Pepsi-Cola was an option because it tended to place minorities in decision-making roles.
Id. at 439. The other top executive was the Senior Vice President of Human Relations, who allegedly
told Lowery that he believed sales at stores with black managers went down and, allegedly told another
employee that there were few minorities in decision-making roles at Circuit City and he did not see
that changing because there were so few minorities of the caliber required for promotion. Id.
201. Id. at 439,446.
202. Lowery, 206 F.3d at 446.
203. Id.

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
214 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1002.
Id.
Id. at 1010.

Id.
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Works' good faith efforts claim.210 Substantial evidence indicated that Wax Works
"minimized" the plaintiff's complaints.1
In response to her complaints, Wax
Works conducted a "cursory" investigation focusing primarily on Ogden's
performance rather than the complained of conduct. 212 Ultimately, Wax Works
forced Ogden to resign after management informed her that the investigation was
over, that the offending supervisor was "an asset" to the company and that there
was no reason to fire him.213 When Ogden asked the Regional Manager if she
could continue working under the offending supervisor given her complaints, he
indicated that she could not.214 Ogden was thereby forced to resign her position,215
and her supervisor was not disciplined.2 6 In light of Wax Works' failure to
respond effectively to the plaintiff's complaints, its written anti-discrimination
policies were found
insufficient to demonstrate its good faith efforts to comply
217
with Title VII.
B.

District CourtDecisions
1.

Cases Recognizing the Good Faith Efforts Defense

In Lintz v. American GeneralFinance, Inc.,218 two former female employees
of American General Finance, Inc. ("American Finance"), Susan Lintz ("Lintz")
and Connie Diecidue ("Diecidue") sued American Finance for sexual harassment
allegedly committed by their supervisors. 219 Following a trial of their claims, the
jury found that both women had been subjected to sexual harassment but only
awarded compensatory damages of $25,000 to Diecidue2 0 The jury also declined
to award punitive damages to either plaintiff.22
In post trial motions, Lintz asked, among other things, that the trial court
grant her a new trial on punitive damages tm In rejecting her request, the court
noted the following with respect to the evidence offered by American Finance
concerning its "good faith efforts" defense:m
In support of their "good faith" defense, defendants introduced evidence through
several management employees that plaintiff Lintz never complained about sexual
harassment in the workplace until after she resigned her employment. Although
Ms. Lintz testified that she did report the harassment, the jury assessed the
210.
211.
212
213.
214.
215.

Id.
Ogden, 214 F.3d at 1010.
Id.
Id. at 1004-05, 1010.
Id. at 1005.
Id. at 1010.

216. Id.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Ogden, 214 F.3d at 1010.
76 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (D. Kan. 1999).
Id.
Id.
Id.

222. Id. at 1204-05.
223. Id. at 1207-08.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol36/iss3/4

22

2001]

Powell and Crane: Complying with the Mandate of Kolstad: Are Your Good Faith Effort
COMPLYING WITH THE MANDATE OFKOLSTAD
613

credibility of all witnesses. Based on the testimony of defendants' witnesses, the
jury could have concluded, in determining whether to award punitive damages, that
Ms. Lintz never reported sexual harassment to any of defendants' management-level
employees. In addition, defendants presented evidence that they acted promptly
and appropriately in the face of plaintiff Diecidue's complaints about sexual
harassment. In that regard, the undisputed evidence at trial demonstrated that
Ms. Diecidue did not complain about sexual harassment until after she resigned.
Defendants' evidence demonstrated that defendants began an immediate
investigation into Ms. Diecidue's allegations of sexual harassment as soon as those
allegations were discovered in her exit questionnaire. According to several
witnesses, the investigation included interviews of employees and the removal of
Mr. Johansen from the workplace.
Ultimately, defendants terminated the
employment of Mr. Johansen based on Ms. Diecidue's complaints. In short, there
was ample evidence before the jury to support its finding that punitive damages
were not warranted here.24

The district court in Hull v. Apcoa/StandardParking Corp. 2 ("Standard"),
reached a similar conclusion before trial in a case involving a male who claimed
that he was sexually harassed by his female supervisor.2 6 Standard asked the
district court to grant summary judgment in its favor on all of the plaintiff's claims,
including his claim for punitive damages. 2 7 In reaching its decision to grant
summary judgment in favor of Standard on the claim for punitive damages, the
court discussed the Kolstad decision and how Standard established its "good faith
efforts" to comply with Title VII. 2
It observed that Standard had a
nondiscrimination and anti-harassment policy in effect during Hull's employment,
that the policy adequately described the steps an employee could take to report
harassment and discrimination, and that Hull received a copy of the policy and
attended a training session where the policy was covered.229 Like the court in
Lintz, this court also concluded that Hull did not make his complaint known to
other managers or the human resources department.23 Accordingly,231Standard was
entitled to summary judgment on Hull's claim for punitive damages.

224. Lintz, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 1207-08.
225. 2000 WL 198881 (N.D. IMI.Feb. 14,2000).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at *14.
229. Id. at *14-15.
230. Id.
231. Hull, 2000 WL 198881, at *14-15. Other district court decisions decided since the Hull case
relied upon similar facts to grant summary judgment in favor of the employer on the plaintiff's claim of
punitive damages. See Woodward v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, 2000 WL 680415 (S.D. Ind.
March 20, 2000). (In granting the company's request that the court dismiss the plaintiff's claim for
punitive damages because of its good faith efforts, the court first considered the plaintiff's failure to
report the store manager's alleged harassing behavior to the appropriate human resources
representative; the fact that the company policy gave employees an alternative reporting mechanism
for reporting any alleged harassment by their immediate supervisors; her refusal to discuss any
incidents of alleged harassment with the company's EEO representative; and the signed forms
acknowledging her receipt of the company's policies and attendance at a two-day sexual harassment
training session); Fuller v. Caterpillar, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D. Ill. 2000). (In deciding that
Caterpillar had no liability for punitive damages because it had made good faith efforts to comply with
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Cases Rejecting the Good Faith Efforts Defense

The following cases clearly illustrate situations that employers must avoid in
order to comply with the good faith efforts standard announced in Kolstad.
In Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc.,z2 2 ("Kenworth") the plaintiff, Bradley
Miller ("Miller"), who is Mexican-American, worked for Kenworth in the Parts
Department of its tractor-trailer dealership located in Dothan, Alabama.u 3
Although Miller only worked for Kenworth for a little over three months before
he was terminated, he claimed that he was subjected to racial harassment during
his employment which caused a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.234 He based his racial harassment claim on alleged
derogatory statements by the Shop Foreman who, according to Miller, referred to
him in racially derogatory terms on an almost daily basis, and even in the presence
of the Service Manager.2s 5 He also claimed that Kenworth fired him in retaliation
for his threat to sue Kenworth for race discrimination.ns After he sued Kenworth,
a jury rendered a verdict in his favor on the hostile work environment claim and
awarded him $25,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive
damages.237 Kenworth filed various motions with the court asking that the court
essentially overrule the jury's verdict and find in its favor?3 The court rejected all
of Kenworth's arguments.2s 9 It specifically discussed why Miller had presented
sufficient evidence to support the award of punitive damages and why Kenworth
could not rely upon the "good faith efforts" defense recognized in Kolstad.24 0
In reaching its decision to uphold the award of punitive damages, the court
found that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial of the Service
Manager's actual knowledge of the harassment directed at Miller. The court also
found that the Service Manager essentially "said nothing and did nothing" in
response to Miller's complaints about the harassment, and that he was ignorant of
Kenworth's personnel policies. 241 The court went on to explain that because it had

Title VII, the Court relied upon Caterpillar's response to the plaintiff's complaint of sexual
harassment, its dissemination and posting of its sexual harassment policies, and its training sessions in
which all employees, supervisory and non-supervisory, were required to attend) (emphasis added);
Jaudon v. Elder Health, Ina, 2000 WL 1918691 (D. Md. Dec. 19, 2000). (In granting summary
judgment in favor of Elder Health on plaintiff's claim for punitive damages, the court relied upon the

fact that the human resources director promptly investigated the plaintiff's complaint of alleged sexual
harassment and issued a written warning to the alleged harasser; the company had published its
policies concerning sexual harassment and equal opportunity and had posted Title VII notices in all
employee break rooms advising its employees that gender discrimination in the workplace was
prohibited; and the alleged harassment stopped after plaintiff contacted human resources.) Id.
232. 82 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (M.D. Ala. 2000).

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 1302.
Id.
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1302.
Id.

238. Miller, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.

239. Id. at 1306 & 1310.
240. Id. at 1306-10.
241. [T]he court finds that there was ample evidence from which a jury could conclude that
Mr. Brooks heard Mr. Galpin call Plaintiff derogatory names. That is, Plaintiff testified that
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a deficient anti-harassment policy, Kenworth could not claim that the Service
Manager's actions were contrary to its good faith efforts to comply with Title
VII. 242 The policy prohibited discrimination but failed to inform employees about
what they should do if they in fact were ever subjected to discrimination. 243
Kenworth also failed to inform its employees about the policy and managementlevel employees, including the President, testified that they never read Kenworth's
sexual harassment policy. 244 Under such circumstances, the court had no choice
but to reject Kenworth's argument that it made good faith efforts to comply with
Title VII.
Another district court rejected the employer's argument that it made good
faith efforts to comply with the law simply because it distributed an antidiscrimination policy. In Copley v. Bax Global, Inc.,245 a former employee of Bax
246
Global claimed that his employment was terminated because he is not Hispanic.
The trial court denied the employer's motion for summary judgment and the case
proceeded to trial. 247 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, awarding
him $500,000 in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages. 248
The company argued in post-trial motions that it should not be liable for the
punitive damages because it made good faith efforts to comply with the law2 49 As
an example, the company argued that it had in place a company-wide nondiscrimination policy and, therefore, could not be subjected to an award of
punitive damages. 250 In rejecting the argument, the court cited cases standing for
the proposition that simply having a non-discrimination policy in place is
insufficient to invoke the good faith efforts defense.251 The court went on to note
that, "[f]or the good faith effort exception to apply, there must be a policy of nondiscrimination both in words and in practice.''2 52 The court also observed that the
evidence presented by the plaintiff at trial demonstrated that Bax Global's highest
management officials made a calculated decision to terminate the plaintiff's

Mr. Brooks was "in the shop" when the name calling occurred and that Mr. Brooks or other

management employees were "there" when Mr. Galpin was calling Plaintiff racial names. (Tr. at 43,
72) ...

Accordingly, the court finds that the evidence supports a finding that Mr. Brooks had actual

knowledge of the harassment." Il at 1307. The Court also observed "that, when Plaintiff mentioned
the name calling to Mr. Brooks, Mr. Brooks said nothing and did nothing in response." Id. at 1308. He
also never reported Miller's complaints to his supervisors and "never bothered to read any of
Kenworth's policies." Id.
242. Miller, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 1310-11.

243. "[W]hile Kenworth's Workplace Conduct Policy prohibits "the use of... discriminatory
remarks or name calling," ... , it does not provide any procedures that an employee should take if he
or she is the victim of the proscribed conduct." Id. at 1311.

244. Id. at 1311 (emphasis added).
245. 97 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (S.D. Fla. 2000).

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 1166.
Id.
Id. at 1167.
Id. at 1168.
Id.
Copley, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1169.

252. Id. (emphasis added).
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employment in order to replace him with an individual of Hispanic descent 3
Such actions clearly demonstrated a violation of the defendant's own nondiscrimination policy and federal law and, therefore, precluded the defendant
from utilizing Kolstad's good faith exception to punitive damages.2
As noted previously in Kenworth, an employer cannot satisfy Kolstad's good
faith efforts defense if one of its own managers is unfamiliar with the company's
procedures for reporting harassment.u55 The district court in Mays v. Union Camp
Corp.156 addressed an employer's motion for summary judgment on the issue of
punitive damages in the context of a claim of race discrimination. The plaintiff,
who is African-American, claimed that the company failed to promote him to
several temporary "set-up" supervisor positions because of his race.257 After he
filed his complaint, the company moved for summary judgment on a number of his
claims, including his claim for punitive damages.u 8
The company argued that any denial of promotions to Mays was contrary to
its good faith efforts to comply with Title VII.259 As an example of its good faith
efforts, the company pointed to its EEO policy, its internal complaint procedure,
and the EEO training that it frequently gave its employees and managers. 260
Nevertheless, the Court rejected the company's alleged good faith efforts because
it was not convinced that its management employees were well informed about the
company's EEO policy.261 In reaching its decision, it relied primarily upon the
deposition testimony of the Assistant Maintenance Superintendent who was
262
involved in at least one of the promotion decisions contested by the plaintiff.
The record in the case revealed that complaints of discrimination had been
brought to the attention of the superintendent and when asked why he did not
investigate a specific complaint, he testified that he "did not know where to go
with it."
This testimony alone undermined the employer's
contention that it
2 64
VII.
Title
with
comply
to
efforts
faith
undertook good
VI. MAKING THE CASE FOR GOOD FAITH EFFORTS
The Court in Kolstad recognized that there are certain situations "where
intentional discrimination does not give rise to punitive damages." 265 Those
include: (a) where the employer is simply unaware of the anti-discrimination laws;
(b) the employer believes that "its discrimination is lawful"; (c) the plaintiff is
253. Id.

254. Id.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

See supra note 152.
114 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (M.D. Ala. 2000).
Id.
Id. at 1233-34.
Id. at 1250.
Id.
Id.
Mays, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 1250.

263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526,536-37 (1999).
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pursuing a "novel" or "poorly recognized" theory of liability; or (d) the employer
believes that it has a bona fide defense to charges of discrimination because of its
occupational qualifications or statutory exceptions.2 6 Most employers are never
in a position to claim that they fall within any of these exceptions267 Thus, they
must be prepared to make the best case they can for why they have established
their good faith compliance with Title VII and other statutes prohibiting
discrimination and harassment in the workplace. Before discussing the necessary
steps employers must take to credibly argue that their good faith efforts bar an
award of punitive damages, it is important to first recognize the circumstances in
which the courts will not entertain such an argument.
A.

CircumstancesWhere the Courts Will Not Considerthe Defense

As noted supra, Kolstad's good faith efforts defense to punitive damages
applies in situations involving vicarious liability - the employer's liability is
imputed based on the conduct of its agents. 258 The defense, therefore, will not
apply in situations where the court can impose direct liability for punitive
damages. 269 The Kolstad Court recognized this implicitly when it instructed the
lower court to consider the good faith efforts defense only if the discriminatory
promotion decision was made by the lower-level manager 70 Whereas if the
decision maker was the executive director (the employer's highest level
executive), the Court specified that the only pertinent inquiry concerning the
propriety of punitive damages is whether the executive director acted with malice
or reckless indifference in making the promotion decision7zn As the Fourth
Circuit observed in Lowery, the Kolstad defense will not be considered if one
acting as a principal of the company engages in the discrimination.272 The other
circumstance recognized by the Tenth Circuit in the Deters case is where the
company designates a specific manager as responsible for enforcing the company's
anti-discrimination/harassment policies, and the manager fails to adequately
respond to discrimination or harassment of which he/she knew or should have
known.27 Finally, the Ninth Circuit in Passantino observed that an employer's
good faith efforts are irrelevant in circumstances where high-level managers acting
as proxies engage in the alleged discrimination.274
Unfortunately, neither Lowery nor Passantino specifically describe the
circumstances in which an agent of a company will be deemed to have been acting

266. Id.
267. But see Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d. 365, 375-76 (7th Cir. 2000). The Seventh Circuit

reversed an award of punitive damages in the amount $500,000 because the defendant wrongfully
believed that the plaintiff was not disabled under the ADA.
268. See supranotes 56-71 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
270. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 546.
271. Id.
272. See supra note 57.
273. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 57.
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as a "principal" or "proxy" for purposes of imposing liability for punitive
damages. 27s Nevertheless, the clear message from Kolstad and these cases is that
the defense will not apply if a high-level executive or someone designated to
enforce the company's anti-discrimination
policies, actually engages in or ratifies
276
conduct.
harassing
or
discriminatory
B.

Circumstancesin Which CourtsAre Likely to Reject the Defense

It is difficult to anticipate every circumstance that may cause courts to reject
or accept an employer's argument that its good faith efforts should bar punitive
damages. However, based on the cases discussed in this article, the facts making it
unlikely that the defense will be recognized include the following:
* The employer has a policy in place addressing workplace
discrimination, but the policy is deficient or the policy is not
adequately disseminated or publicized.277
" The employer has not educated or trained its employees and
managers
concerning
its
policies
or
about
the
requirements/prohibitions
of
the
laws
prohibiting
discrimination/harassment. 27
* The employer was aware of the discrimination/harassment and
failed to promptly and adequately respond to the employee's
complaints. 279
* The employer minimized the employee's complaints, made
statements indicating a preference for the person who was the
subject of the complaint, or made the employee feel as if he/she
might suffer retaliation for complaining.?
* The employer's investigation of the complaint of workplace
harassment/discrimination is a "sham," conducted in an unfair
manner or is otherwise deficient.281
* Managers responsible for enforcing the company's policies or
training employees concerning the requirements and prohibitions of
the anti-discrimination laws are themselves ignorant about the same
or the company's anti-discrimination policiesm
These are the primary facts highlighted by the relevant cases which, if
supported, will undermine an employer's efforts to obtain summary judgment on a
plaintiff's claim for punitive damages or to convince the trial court not to allow the
jury to consider the claim. Employers should also familiarize themselves with the
factors that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission believes support an
275. See supra note 57.

276. See supranotes 57, 61 and accompanying text.
277. See supranotes 242-45 and accompanying text.
278. See supranotes 96-99 and accompanying text.
279. See supranotes 111-19, 137 and accompanying text.

280. See supranotes 132-33, 148-54 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.

282. See supranotes 96-100,164, 245, 262-64 and accompanying text.
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award of punitive damages.28s
C.

Steps to Ensure the Defense Is Available
1.

Establish Adequate Policies

The cases describing when the Kolstad defense is recognized provide several
examples of what employers can do to avoid punitive damages awards. The
obvious first step is to ensure that the company has in place adequate policies
addressing workplace discrimination and/or harassment. Even Kolstad recognized
that "the existence of a written policy instituted in good faith has operated as a
total bar to employer liability for punitive damages." s4 The determination of
whether a policy is adequate involves several considerations. One of the most
important, however, as reflected in the decisions addressing the Kolstad defense, is
whether the policy clearly describes the procedure for reporting or otherwise
putting the employer on notice about discrimination or harassment in the
workplace.2s ' Employers have successfully disposed of claims for punitive
damages at the summary judgment stage of a case where the employer's policy
was adequate and the complaining employee failed to follow the company's
6
procedure for reporting incidents of discrimination or harassment."8
2.

Educate Managers and Non-Managers

The next essential step is to ensure that all employees, including
management personnel, are fully informed about the company's antidiscrimination policies. A well drafted and complete policy must be "instituted in
good faith" in order to qualify for the Kolstad defense. 28 This goal can only be
accomplished by making sure that personnel at all levels in the company are
familiar with and understand how the policies work. As noted in the cases
discussed in this article, a manager or employee's ignorance of anti-discrimination
policies will preclude the good faith efforts defense.
Moreover, the company
must ensure that those who are designated to educate or train employees
concerning the requirements and prohibitions outlined in the anti-discrimination

283. The EEOC's Enforcement Guidance Manual addressing compensatory and punitive damages
lists the following factors, which in the EEOC's opinion, are relevant to a consideration of whether
punitive damages should be imposed against the employer: (1) the degree of egregiousness and nature
of the respondent's conduct; (2) the nature, extent and severity of the harm to the complaining party;

(3) the duration of the discriminatory conduct; (4) the existence and frequency of similar past
discriminatory conduct; (5) evidence that the respondent planned and/or attempted to conceal or cover
up the discriminatory practices or conduct; (6) the employer's actions after it was informed of
discrimination; (7) proof of threats or deliberate retaliatory action against complaining parties for
complaints to management or for filing a charge. See Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory and
Punitive DamagesAvailable under §102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, No. N-915.002 (July 14, 1992).
284. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544.
285. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 224-25,230-32 and accompanying text.
287. Kolstad,527 U.S. at 544.
288. See supra notes 96-99, 164,245,262-64 and accompanying text.
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laws, are well versed in those subjects. In other words, someone who does not
understand the concept of reasonable accommodation or what constitutes sexual
harassment, should not be training other managers or employees.u 9 Further,
employers should require both managers and non-managers to attend periodic
training courses which address the company policies and the laws prohibiting
discrimination and harassment in the workplace.29 Such attendance should be
confirmed in writing through a sign-in sheet or otherwise, and the sign-in sheets or
other documentation should be kept in the employee's personnel file.
3.

Educate the High Level Executives

As noted earlier, courts will not consider the good faith efforts defense if the
circumstances require imposing direct liability, such as when someone acting as a
"proxy" or "principal" of a corporation engages in discriminatory or harassing
conduct. Because the CEO's and COO's of many corporations are often too busy
to attend seminars and other training sessions given to lower-level managers,
employers must make a concerted effort to ensure that these individuals receive
the same information and training as the lower-level managers and non-managers.
The most embarrassing moment of any high-level executive's career is when he or
she expresses ignorance of the company's anti-discrimination policies and/or the
requirements of Title VII during the course of litigation, either at trial or during a
deposition. Further, such testimony will undoubtedly be used to impose direct
liability for punitive damages or to at least undermine the company's claim that it
exercised good faith efforts to comply with Title VII.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is no ready formula prescribing the good faith efforts necessary to
preclude a jury's consideration of punitive damages for intentional discrimination.
What is certain, however, is that courts considering claims under Title VII, the
ADA, and other anti-discrimination statutes expect employers, at a minimum, to
have adequate policies prohibiting workplace discrimination and to make good
faith efforts to implement the policies. Moreover, all personnel from the CEO to
the line employee should be familiar with the policies and the procedures for
reporting harassment or discrimination in the workplace. Although the practical
burden of complying with the mandate of Kolstad may be high, there typically is
no other viable option for employers facing liability for punitive damages.

289. See supranotes 96-99, 164 and accompanying text.
290. It is also imperative to educate managers and other responsible personnel as to the appropriate
manner in which an investigation into alleged workplace discrimination or harassment should be
conducted. The good faith efforts defense will not apply in situations where an investigation is
conducted in an inappropriate manner. See supranotes 188-92 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol36/iss3/4

30

